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NOTES
The Newsworthiness Defense
to the Public Disclosure Tort
BY GEOFF DENDY*
INTRODUCrION
T he concept of an individual right to privacy originated in the
1890 Harvard Law Review article, authored by Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, entitled The Right to Privacy' The
authors characterized privacy as "the right to be let alone,"2 and this
article is regarded as perhaps the single most influential law review article
to date.3 In the one hundred years since Warren and Brandeis penned
their famous piece, thirty-six jurisdictions have acknowledged a common
law right to privacy 4 Invasion of privacy is generally recogmzed to
encompass four separate torts: unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion;
appropriation of some aspect of a person's personality for commercial
use; public disclosure of private facts; and publicity which places a
* J.D. expected 1997, Umversity of Kentucky; B.A. 1994, The College of
William and Mary.
' Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv
L. REv 193 (1890).
The "first real application of tis [tort] was m a Kentucky case." WLLIAM
L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs § 119, at 809 (4th ed. 1971)
(citing Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W 867 (Ky. 1927)).
2 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193 (commenting that the law developed
to afford individuals the right to be free from unsolicited media exposure).
3 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALiF. L. REv 383, 383 (1960).
4 Barbara Moretti, Note, Outing: Justifiable or Unwarranted Invasion of
Privacy? The Private Facts Tort as a Remedy For Disclosures of Sexual
Orientation, 11 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 857, 899 (1993).
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person in a false light before the public.5 This Note, however, only
addresses the public disclosure of private facts tort and its attendant
defense,6 newsworthiness; and analyzes which formulation of the defense
the Supreme Court is likely to accept if and when it considers the issue.
The public disclosure of private facts tort has received a great deal
of critical commentary due to its inherent conflicts with the First
Amendment.7 In theory, if a newspaper publishes an embarrassing, but
true,8 fact about an individual, the paper may be liable for the public
disclosure of a private fact, although the media has First Amendment
protection to print the information.9 But the general case is that many
courts provide media with the extraordinarily broad newsworthiness
defense,1" leaving the public disclosure tort effectively impotent." As
I RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
6 Generally, however, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof regarding
newsworthiness. See Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 273
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989); Howard v. Des Moines Register
and Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289, 300 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904
(1980); Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 768-70 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983). Therefore, newsworthiness is not, technically, a defense. Nevertheless,
courts often refer to th'e "newsworthiness defense." See, e.g., Annosen v.
Donahue, 857 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2135 (1994).
The effect of placing the burden of proof regarding newsworthiness on the
plaintiff is that the plaintiff must prove that the allegedlyprivate information was
not newsworthy. In other words, the plaintiff must prove a negative. Therefore,
the placement of the burden on the plaintiff puts the plaintiff at a tremendous
disadvantage - a much greater disadvantage than would be the case if news-
worthiness were truly a defense.
7 John P. Elwood, Note, Outing, Privacy, and The First Amendment, 102
YALE L.J. 747, 754 (1992) ("A tort based on the publication of truthful
information is necessarily bounded by the First Amendment.").
' Note that the public disclosure of private facts tort only applies to true
disclosures. If the disclosure is false, then a false light claim is appropriate.
' Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305, 307 (10th Cir. 1981)
("The first amendment sometimes protects what would otherwisebe an actionable
invasion of privacy where a publication by the media is involved.").
10 See infra Part III.
n See Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980):
This latter privilege [newsworthiness] is not merely limited to the
dissemination of news either in the sense of current events or commen-
tary upon public affairs. Rather, [newsworthiness] extends to informa-
tion concerning interesting phases of human activity and embraces all
[VOL. 85
PUBLIC DIsCLOsuRE TORT
one court explained: "Recognizing the critical position the right to
freedom of speech and press occupies in our society, courts are under-
standably sensitive to any infringement of these rights."'2 Courts have
defined "newsworthy" a number of different ways, but the result has
generally been the same: newsworthy disclosures of private true facts are
privileged."
In Part I, this Note examines the background of the public disclosure
tort and its limited treatment by the Supreme Court. Part II presents the
various tests for newsworthiness employed by courts, and will attempt to
find the test for newsworthiness that strikes the best balance between the
First Amendment and the individual's right to be free of unwanted
publicity. The final Part argues that the test for newsworthiness advocated
by both the Ninth Circuit in Virgil v. Time, Inc.,4 and adopted by the
Restatement," strikes the most appropriate balance between the First
Amendment and the individual's right to privacy, and as such is the test
most likely to be adopted by the Supreme Court if and when it should
consider the issue.'6
I. THE PUBLIC DIsCLosuRE TORT
No universal understanding exists as to exactly what the right to
privacy entails. Since its characterization by Warren and Brandeis as "the
right to be left alone,"' 7 courts have defined privacy rights in various
issues about which information is needed or appropriate so that
individuals may cope with the exigencies of this period.
Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis'Privacy Tort, 68 CoRNELL L. REV. 291, 351 (1983).
12 Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 769 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983).
" See Jenkins v. Dell Publ'g Co., 251 F.2d 447, 450 (3d Cir.) (noting that
courts are reluctant to make "factually accuratepublic disclosures tortious"), cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 921 (1958).
"4 Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that an
invasion of privacy cause of action for publication of private facts was properly
stated notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff consented and then withdrew
consent), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976).
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
16 Linda N. Woito & Patrick McNulty, The Privacy Disclosure Tort and the
First Amendment: Should the Community Decide Newsworthiness?, 64 IOWA L.
REv. 185, 232 (1979) (arguing for a community decency standard to replace the
newsworthiness defense in the disclosure of a private facts tort).
'" Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193.
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ways." The Supreme Court of Kentucky has loosely characterized this
concept as the right a private person has to live free from public
interference with matters not of public concern." However, the right of
privacy is subject to restrictions and is not absolute. Defining where these
exact limits lie has resulted in substantial judicial inconsistency,
particularly with respect to the newsworthiness defense. As Justice
Brennan stated in Time, Inc. v. Hill,2" "[e]xposure of the self to others
in varying degrees is a concomitant to life in a civilized community."'
A proper consideration of the newsworthiness defense requires an
understanding of the public disclosure tort. The basic elements of the
public disclosure tort vary by jurisdiction.2" However, the Restatement
definition is frequently accepted,23 and is typical of many courts' formu-
lation of the tort. This Note will therefore employ the Restatement's
elements of the tort as its working formula. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652D states as follows:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
the matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.24
Similarly, several courts follow Professor Prosser's formulation of the
tort, which requires the following: (a) a public disclosure, (b) of a private
fact, (c) that is highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (d) is not
newsworthy.25 Essentially, the Restatement rephrases Prosser.
The disclosed fact must be private. The inherent confusion in the
public disclosure tort is evidenced by the inconsistent facts which courts
18 McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 887
(Ky. 1981) (holding that the issue of whether the defendant had placed the
plaintiff in a "false" light is ajury question), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 975 (1982).
" Id.; see, e.g., Yancey v. Hamilton, 786 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1989) (discuss-
ing the "false" light cause of action); Pearce v. Courier-Journal, 683 S.W.2d 633
(Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (discussing the "false" light cause of action).
20 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (holding that a magazine article
concerning a fictionalization of a true event is protected speech).
21 d. at 388.
' Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 299.
23 id.
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
25 PROSSER, supra note 1, § 117, at 809-12.
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have defined as private. 6 Generally, a disclosure is deemed to be a
private fact if the information was not in the public domain prior to
publication. Several courts recognizing the private facts tort have defined
a private fact as one not known to the public prior to the defendant's
disclosure.27 Therefore, a claimant under the public disclosure tort
cannot prevail if the information was already in the public domain.2"
Furthermore, the disclosure must be in the form of publicity. Publicity
means communication to the general public, or "to so many persons that
the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of
public knowledge." '29 Disclosure to only one person does not qualify as
publicity.3"
The primary two defenses to the public disclosure tort are consent3'
and newsworthiness.32 Consent is easily asserted where the plaintiff in
the private facts suit had knowledge of the contents of the disclosure and
acquiesced to its publication.33 Newsworthiness, however, is not subject
to a similar uniform definition, and has accordingly generated a degree
of judicial confusion.3" Essentially, the defense amounts to a showing
that the public has a legitimate interest in the disclosed fact,35 and, if
established, precludes any recovery under the private facts tort.36 Warren
and Brandeis first suggested this defense when they wrote that "[t]he right
to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public
26 Woito & McNulty, supra note 16, at 192.
27 Kilgore v. Younger, 640 P.2d 793, 797 (Cal. 1982) (relying on
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977)); Howard v. Des Moines
Register, 283 N.W.2d 289, 298 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980);
Harris v. Easton Publ'g Co., 483 A.2d 1377, 1384 (Pa. Super. 1984) (relying on
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977)).
28 Harris, 483 A.2d at 1381.
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977).
30 Harris, 483 A.2d at 1384.
3, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652F (consent is an absolute
defense to both defamation and invasion of privacy torts).32 DWIGHT L. TEETER & DON R. LE DUC, LAW OF MASS COMMUNI-
CATIONS: FREEDOM AND CONTROL OF PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA § 39, at
269 (7th ed. 1992).
3 3 1rd.
34 rd.
35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d (1977).
36 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Dell Publ'g Co., 251 F.2d 447, 450 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 921 (1958); Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858, 861 (W.D.
Pa. 1976).
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or general interest." '37 The newsworthiness defense incorporates the First
Amendment free speech protections by allowing liability only for
communications lacking legitimate public interest.38 Courts have
gradually increased the scope of the newsworthy defense since its initial
formulation in 1890.39 The effect of this expansion has been a steady
decrease in the effectiveness of the private facts tort, prompting one
commentator to observe that the defense has effectively "swallowed" 40
the tort.
The courts have formulated several methods of deciding whether a
private fact is newsworthy and have applied those methods with varying
results. This diversity of approaches to newsworthiness has lead to
inconsistent standards of conduct and has created a gray area in which
liability may or may not attach to private fact disclosures.4 A similar
lack of uniformity exists regarding whether newsworthiness should be a
question of law or a question of fact. While the majority of jurisdictions
consider newsworthiness a question of fact to be decided by the jury,4 2
the broad treatment that most courts give the defense allows the defendant
to prevail easily on summary judgment motions, and therefore to escape
jury scrutiny.4 3 The ease with which many public disclosure defendants
prevail on summary judgment with the newsworthiness defense effective-
ly prevents jury scrutiny of the media, and leads to the subordination of
individual privacy interests in favor of First Amendment concerns.'
This is not necessarily a bad result, and is consistent with the frequently
articulated principle of the "firstness of the First Amendment. ' 4 The
37 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214.
38 Elwood, supra note 7, at 754.
3 Id. at 755.
40 Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 326, 336 (1966) ("What is at issue...
is whether the claim of privilege is not so overpowering as virtually to swallow
the tort.").
41 See infra Part 1H.
42 See, e.g., Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 773 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding that the jury was the proper body to decide newsworthi-
ness).
13 Woito & McNulty, supra note 16, at 197.
44Id.
4' This language began with Edmond Cahn, The Firstness of the First
Amendment, 65 YALE L.J. 464 (1956) where the author argued that Justice
Black's interpretation of the First Amendment is in keeping with Jefferson's and
Madison's ideals and therefore "maintain[s] the firstness of the First Amend-
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result, however, is that it is extremely difficult for a plaintiff to prevail
in a public disclosure claim against the media.
4 6
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S LIMITED TREATMENT
OF THE PUBLIC DIsCLosuuE OF PRIVATE FACrS TORT
The private facts tort, with its implicit censorship of certain speech,
naturally conflicts with the First Amendment.4 7 As constitutional
arbitrator, the burden of developing a balance between these two concerns
falls on the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court has not yet
considered the outright constitutionality of the public disclosure tort.48
As Justice Marshall explained in Florida Star v. B.J.F.:49
Our decisions in cases involving government attempts to sanction the
accurate dissemination of information as invasive of privacy have not
... exhaustively considered this conflict.... [A]lthough our decisions
have without exception upheld the press' right to publish, we have
emphasized each time that we were resolving this conflict only as it
arose in a discrete factual context.50
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,"' the Court considered a public
disclosure of private facts claim brought by the father of a deceased rape
victim against the owner of a television station that broadcast the victim's
name. The Court chose not to consider the general constitutional validity
of the public disclosure tort in light of the First Amendment, any
discussion of which would have to take into account whether the
newsworthiness defense provided sufficient First Amendment protection
for the defendant.5" This analysis would also have required an express
examination of the various tests for newsworthiness. However, the Court
did state that the private facts tort represents the greatest current judicial
ment." Id. at 481.
46 Woito & McNulty, supra note 16, at 197.
"7 Mark Schadrack, Note, Privacy and the Press: a Necessary Tension, 18
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 949, 951 (1985).
48 See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 490 (1975).
41 Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
50 Id. at 530.
s' Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
52 Id. at 491 ("Rather than address the broader question of whether truthful
publications may ever be subjectedto civil or criminal liability consistently with
the First and Fourteenth Amendments .... ).
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conflict with the First Amendment." Instead of broadly considering the
constitutionality of the tort, the Cox Broadcasting Court narrowly
confined its ruling to the question of whether information obtained from
public records can ever create liability for the public disclosure of a
private fact.5 4 The Court held that liability cannot result from disclosure
of private facts already in public records.5" Therefore, the television
station was not liable for discloging the rape victim's name since it was
obtained from public court records. 6
The Court impliedly rejected consideration of the newsworthiness
defense in this situation when it declined to consider whether the facts
disclosed from a public record were offensive.57 In this determination,
the Court indicated that it was incorporating First Amendment consider-
ations.5  By declining to consider the character of the disclosed informa-
tion, the Court carved out an exception to the public disclosure tort in
which no liability may attach - the disclosure of private facts contained
in a public record. 9 In its refusal to broadly consider the constitutional-
ity of the public disclosure tort, the Court placed a heavy burden with the
states when it noted that they should protect privacy interests by avoiding
the release of private facts in court documents.6"
Despite the Court's refusal in Cox Broadcasting to expressly consider
the private facts tort, the Court impliedly concedes that the press may be
liable, in certain instances, for disclosures of private facts when it held
that no liability may attach to disclosures of private facts found in
supposedly protected public records.6" The negative implication of this
holding is that liability might attach to disclosures not arising from public
documents. For this reason, the Cox Broadcasting decision can be seen
5' Id. at 489.54 Id. at 491.
55 Id. at 496-97.
56 Id.
51 Id. at 494-96. Consideration of the level of offensiveness of a private
fact derived from public records "would make it very difficult for the media to
inform citizens about the public business and yet stay within the law." Id. at
496.
58 Id. ("[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments will not allow exposing the
press to liability for truthfully publishing information released to the public in
official court records.").
" Schadrack, supra note 47, at 959 (characterizingpublic record rule as the
"'matter of public concern' exception.").
60 Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 496.
61 Id.
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as a pyrrhic victory for freedom of the press advocates, instead of the
broad mandate for media freedom it may appear to be at first glance.
Fifteen years after the Cox Broadcasting decision, the Supreme Court
again had occasion to consider the public disclosure of private facts in the
case of Florida Star v. B.J.F.62 Significantly, Florida Star implies that
the Cox Broadcasting decision may have rested on unstated newsworthi-
ness considerations, by indicating through its holding that the public
record exception may be fact specific and dependent on the degree of
public interest that the disclosure serves.63 The situation in Florida Star
was remarkably similar to that in Cox Broadcasting. A newspaper had
published the name of a rape victim. The victim sought to hold the paper
liable under a Florida statute prohibiting the media from publishing the
name of a rape victim. Unlike Cox Broadcasting, the victim's name was
not included in a public court record, but was mistakenly included in a
publicly-released police report.' The Florida Star Court again limited
its holding to the narrow issue of whether the media could be liable for
the public disclosure of information lawfully obtained from a record in
the public domain.65 In so holding, the Court declined to consider the
general constitutionality of the private facts tort and the limits, if any, of
the newsworthiness defense:
Nor need we accept appellant's invitation to hold broadly that
truthful publication may never be punished consistent with the First
Amendment .... We continue to believe that the sensitivity and
significance of the interests presented in clashes between First Amend-
ment and privacy rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep
no more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case.66
In Florida Star, the Court acknowledged that "one of the reasons we
gave in Cox Broadcasting for invalidating the challenged damages award
was the important role the press plays in subjecting trials to public
62 Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (holding that First Amend-
ment considerations preclude imposing liability on a newspaper for publishing
a rape victim's name lawfully obtained from a police report).
63 Id. at 541 ("We hold only that where a newspaper publishes truthful
information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be
imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest...
64 Id. at 528.
65 Id. at 533.
66 Id. at 532-33.
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scrutiny and thereby helping guarantee their fairness."'67 It is hardly
debatable that ensuring the fairness of judicial proceedings is a compel-
ling public interest. If, however, the Court would be less likely to apply
the public record exception in a situation where public interest was not
as paramount, as Florida Star indicates, then it effectively has adopted a
newsworthiness test in which certain disclosures from public records are
accorded greater privilege than are others.
The final aspect of the Supreme Court's narrow consideration of the
private facts tort is seen in its brief statement in Time, Inc. v. Hill,6
8
acknowledging the existence of the newsworthiness defense in private
facts suits.69 However, the Time, Inc. Court declined to consider the
constitutionality of a private facts claim, and also provided no guidance
as to which formulation of newsworthiness it would apply if faced with
the issue. In Time, Inc., the Supreme Court analyzed a false light invasion
of privacy claim7 and acknowledged that if the challenged disclosures
are true (as in the case of the private facts tort), then a finding of
newsworthiness is an absolute defense.7 The Court recognized a
decency limitation to the newsworthy defense,7" meaning that even
disclosures of private facts that are of legitimate public concern may be
so offensive that they shock the community's notions of decency and
therefore do not bar liability.7" Aside from this short observation, the
Supreme Court has consistently refused to broadly consider the public
disclosure tort, and has not indicated which, if any, of the various tests
for newsworthiness strikes the requisite balance between the individual's
right to privacy and the First Amendment. Indeed, at least one commenta-
tor has predicted that the private facts tort will not withstand constitution-
67 Id. at 532.
68 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
69 Id. at 381.
70 In a false light invasion of privacy claim, the publicly disclosed
information portrays the plaintiff in a misleading manner. TEETER & LE Duc,
supra note 32, at 290.
71 Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 384.
72 Id. at 384 n.7. In response to the lower court's interpretation of a New
York statute the court stated: "[t]his limitation to newsworthy persons and events
does not.., foreclose an interpretation... to allow damages where the relations
may be so intimate and unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to
outrage the community's notions of decency." Id. (quoting with approval Sidis
v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711
(1940)).73 Id. at 383.
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al scrutiny when the Supreme Court finally considers it m a broad
context, due to the First Amendment's mandated protection of true
speech.74 However, if the public disclosure tort does pass constitutional
muster, the Court must adopt a standard for newsworthiness. Several of
the more prominent approaches to defining exactly what is newsworthy
are discussed below
III. THE CONCEPT OF NEWSWORTHINESS
As noted earlier, assuming the Constitutionality of the private facts
tort, the conclusion that certain private information is of such overrding
public concern that its publication should be privileged has spawned a
variety of methods to determine whether the disclosed information is in
fact newsworthy First Amendment concerns are at the forefront of any
discussion of the newsworthy defense. Since a finding of newsworthiness
permits the publication of truthful private information, it assures that the
privacy tort does not abridge the Constitution. The citizenry has a
necessary stake in the maintenance of a free press: "[Constitutional free
press] guarantees are not for the benefit of the press so much as for the
benefit of all of us. A broadly defined freedom of the press assures the
maintenance of our political system and an open society "75 So long as
the public disclosure tort is recognized, the newsworthy defense helps to
preserve freedom of the press, and therefore assumes constitutional
importance.
All information is arguably of public concern. 76 However, most
jurisdictions recognizing the private facts tort have chosen to draw the
line separating privileged disclosures from invasions of privacy some-
where between absolute freedom of the press and complete censorslup.
The following tests for newsworthiness fall somewhere on this continu-
um.
4 Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 365.
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1975); see also New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,254 (1964). "The general proposition that freedom
of expression is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our
decisions. The constitutional safeguard, we have said, 'was fashioned to assure
the unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people."' Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957)).
76 Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 351.
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A. Complete Rejection of Invasion of Privacy Claims for Publication
of Private True Facts
At the extreme end of this spectrum are those few jurisdictions that
do not recognize the public disclosure of private facts tort." However,
lack of judicial recognition and outright rejection are two different things,
and only five jurisdictions have rejected the tort outright.78 Such a
determination sacrifices the individual's right to privacy in return for an
assurance of First Amendment protections. By holding that all true speech
is privileged, these jurisdictions impliedly hold that all media communica-
tions are newsworthy and provide true disclosures with greater First
Amendment protection than the United States Supreme Court has required
to date.79 The recent decision by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
Hall v. Post8" is illustrative of this paradigm.
In Hall, North Carolina rejected the public disclosure tort as being
"constitutionally suspect,"" stating that it would add to the tension
between tort law and the First Amendment, and that private fact claims
are more appropriately dealt with by an intentional infliction of emotional
distress suit.8" The Hall court relied on the reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court in Cox Broadcasting, in which the Court stated that
the private facts tort represents the greatest current judicial conflict with
the First Amendment.83
The rationale for according an absolute privilege to truthful disclo-
sures places a premium on protecting freedom of the press,84 and
provides the judicial certainty lacking in the jurisdictions that employ
" Moretti, supra note 4, at 903 ("The following states do not recognize a
cause of action for the publication of private facts: Minnesota, Nebraska, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Virginia.").78 1d. at 901-03 (Nebraska, New York, Utah, Rhode Island, and North
Carolina).
79 Lucy Noble Inman, Hall v. Post: North Carolina Rejects Claim of
Invasion of Privacy by Truthful Publication of Embarrassing Facts, 67 N.C. L.
REv. 1474, 1474 (1989).
80 Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988).
a' Id. at 717.
82 Id. Hall remains binding authority in North Carolina, and to date, North
Carolina has not yielded to the trend in many other states toward recognition of
the public disclosure tort.
83 Id. at 716 (relying on Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489
(1975)).
84 Inman, supra note 79, at 1489.
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abstract legal tests to determine newsworthiness. Under this approach,
truthful speech is privileged and no newsworthiness determination is
required" The chilling effect on the media resulting from uncertain
liability is avoided, and the individual, not the courts, is expected to
protect his own privacy by keeping personal information out of the
media's reach. Consequently, any erosion of the First Amendment
inherent in recognition of the private facts tort is avoided. Under this
approach, however, the downside is that there is no recourse for
publication of offensive true speech.
B. The "Leave It to the Press Model"
Another approach has been characterized by Diane Zimmerman as the
"leave it to the press" model in her famous law review article.86 The
"leave it to the press" approach functions exactly as it sounds, in that it
essentially lets the media decide whether private information is newswor-
thy.87 The result is to hold that "what is printed is by definition of
legitimate public interest,"88 and hence newsworthy. The theoretical
difference between this approach and the Hall approach is that the "leave
it to the press" model recognizes the private facts tort while the Hall
approach does not. However, in practice there is little difference because
the "leave it to the press" approach accords the newsworthy defense such
a broad scope that it essentially leaves the tort ineffective. Zimmerman
argues that judicial deference to editorial judgment is not as random as
it sounds because market controls function to limit unchecked media
discretion.89 Consumer repulsion will put rabid yellow journalists out of
business without the cost to the taxpayers of judicial enforcement.90
5Id.
86 Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 353. Diane Zimmerman is a Professor of
Law at New York University and penned the famous article Requiem for a
Heavyweight. Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, supra note 11,
in which the "leave it to the press" model was first described. A number of
jurisdictions have adopted the "leave it to the press" approach. See, e.g., Berg v.
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 960 (D. Minn. 1948); Howard
v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289, 302 (Iowa 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980).
87 Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 353.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 354.
90 Id. at 292.
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The Third Circuit's decision in Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co.9
illustrates the workings of the "leave it to the press" model. The Jenkins
court refused to distinguish between news as information and news as
entertainment.92 Arguably, since all publications can fall within either
news or entertainment, the court reasoned that everything published is
"news." Since the public always has a legitimate interest in news, it
follows that the mere act of publishing possibly lurid private information
renders it newsworthy. Indeed, the Jenkins court felt that this was a fair
price to pay in order to avoid judicial censorship.93
The "leave it to the press" approach is inherently flawed in its
assumption that the consumer market will operate to censor disclosures
that would not be deemed newsworthy under other standards. One only
has to turn on current daytime television or pick up a tabloid to realize
that intrusive and offensive journalism is alive and well. Under the
Jenkins analysis, "trash TV"9" is legitimized simply by virtue of being
broadcast. This standard is a classic example of what is meant by
commentators who observe that the breadth accorded the newsworthy
defense can render the private facts tort meaningless. 95
C. The Virgil v. Time, Inc.96 and Restatement Approach
The test for newsworthiness developed by the Restatement97 and
first articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Virgil v. Time, Inc.,9' is the most
9' Jenkins v. Dell Publ'g Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir.) (holding that there is
no need to determine whether publication is for entertainment or information in
order to render it newsworthy), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 921 (1958); see also
McNutt v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 538 P.2d 804 (N.M. Ct. App.)
(holding that it is unnecessary to distinguish between entertainment and
information), cert. denied, 540 P.2d 248 (N.M. 1975).
92 Jenkins, 251 F.2d at 451.
93 Id. at 452 ("Any other rule would dangerously and undesirably obstruct
the publication of patently newsworthy items by compelling the publisher to
speculate as to the value judgments of a judge or jury .... ).
9' An example of "trash TV" is: Tempest: Women Confront the Men Who
Got Them Pregnant but Abandoned Their Children (NBC television broadcast,
Oct. 30, 1995). Others include: Ricki Lake, Montel Williams, Jenny Jones, and
Carnie Wilson.
9' See, e.g., Kalven, supra note 40, at 336.
96 Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428
U.S. 998 (1976).
97 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
98 Virgil, 527 F.2d at 1129.
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complex and widely accepted test for newsworthiness. 9  The Virgil court
held that newsworthiness is assessed as follows:
In determining what is a matter of legitimate public interest, account
must be taken of the customs and conventions of the community; and
in the last analysis what is proper becomes a matter of community
mores. The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the
giving of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a
morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with
which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would
say that he had no concern. 100
Therefore, matters of "legitimate public concern" are newsworthy.'
This is a fact question for the jury,'0 2 and is to be assessed based on the
locality's community mores.0 3 This approach allows the jury to hold
defendants liable for disclosures it finds newsworthy if the disclosure
violates the decency limitation.!°4 The eponymous decency limitation
on newsworthy disclosures provides that liability may still attach to
newsworthy publications that are "so intimate and unwarranted in view
of the victim's position as to outrage the community's [jury's] notions of
decency."'0 5 A private fact may be of "legitimate public concern," but
still be so indecent that its publication constitutes an invasion of privacy.
The Virgil standard does not, however, give free rein to the jury.
Despite the directive that newsworthiness and the decency limitation be
issues of fact, strict judicial scrutiny of the evidence is required to
determine whether the defendant should prevail as a matter of law.'06
The possible chilling effect that private fact actions may have on the
First Amendment mandates that the judge treat such cases with "special
care."'0 7 The result of a community mores test combined with judicial
99 Ronald F. Wick, Note, Out of the Closet and Into the Headlines: Outing
and the Private Facts Tort, 80 GEO. L.J. 413, 425 (1991).
100 Virgil, 527 F.2d at 1129 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652F (Tentative Draft No. 13 (1967))) (emphasis added).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1130.
103 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. g (1977).
14 Virgil, 527 F.2d at 1130.
105 Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 711 (1940).
106 Woito & McNulty, supra note 16, at 220.
107 Virgil, 527 F.2d at 1130. "Chilling effect" is a common term used by
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scrutiny is a standard, according to the Virgil court, that is respective
of individual's privacy interests without offending the First Amend-
ment.
108
D. The Nexus Test
Yet another standard for determining newsworthiness has been
developed by the Fifth0 9 and Tenth"' Circuits. In Campbell v. Seabury
Press,"' the claimant, a third party mentioned in a biography written
by the defendant, sued over embarrassing private facts concerning her
marital life disclosed in the book. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the
newsworthy defense by recognizing the existence of a First Amendment
constitutional privilege to disclose information of public interest."
2
Campbell then incorporated the previously discussed decency limita-
tion."' Additionally, Campbell further limited the newsworthiness
privilege by adding its "nexus requirement," which demands that "a
logical nexus [or relationship] exist between the complaining individual
and the matter of legitimate public interest.""' 4 The court concluded that
this extra requirement provides sufficient protection for individual privacy
interests."'5
commentators to describe the detrimental effect on free speech in popular media
that would result from limiting the defense of newsworthiness or expanding the
private fact disclosure tort.
108 Id.
109 Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980); Ross v.
Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
935 (1989).
"' Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981).
.' Campbell, 614 F.2d at 395.
112 Id. at 397.
113 Id.
114 Id. See also Kimberly Wood Bacon, Comment, Florida Sun v. B.J.F. [sic
- the case is named Florida Star v. B.J.F.]: The Right of Privacy Collides With
the First Amendment, 76 IOWA L. REV. 139, 165 (1990) (discussing the failure
of the Supreme Court to protect an individual's right against public disclosure
of private facts).
Apparently, the Fifth Circuit has also refused to distinguish between news
and entertainment. In Campbell, the court discussed the media's privilege to
publish information which concerns "interesting phases of human activity."
Campbell, 614 F.2d at 397.
115 Campbell, 614 F.2d at 397.
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Campbell's reasoning was subsequently adopted by the Tenth Circuit
in Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co.," 6 with substantially the same
effect as in Campbell. However, the Gilbert court defined "nexus" as a
"substantial relevance,""' 7 rather than a "logical relationship."
E. The California Approach
The Supreme Court of California has developed yet another test for
newsworthiness, as expressed in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n." 
8
The court held that newsworthiness is a function of the following factors:
(a) the social value of the information, (b) the extent of the intrusion into
private areas, and (c) the extent to which the complaining party has
voluntarily placed himself/herself in the public eye.' A disclosure
deemed newsworthy by the above analysis may still be subject to judicial
censorship under the decency limitation. 120 However, the decency
limitation is given a slightly different interpretation by the California
courts than in the Ninth Circuit.' In order for the newsworthy disclo-
sure to be deemed indecent, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
published the information with "reckless disregard."'2 The Briscoe
court felt that this additional restriction on the decency limitation would
prevent any resulting "chill" on First Amendment freedoms. ' Addi-
tionally, the California approach allows the First Amendment to prevail
in the case of an even balance between a newsworthy disclosure and the
decency limitation. 24
F. General Problems with the Practical Extent of the Newsworthiness
Defense
The extreme practical scope which most courts give the newsworthy
defense greatly exceeds its theoretical scope.'25 While in theory news-
116 Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981).
117 Id.
"8 Briscoe v. Readers' Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
119 Id. at 43.
120 Id. at 42-43.
121 For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's approach, see supra notes 96-108
and accompanying text.
12 Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 44.
2BId. at 43.
124 Id.
"z Kalven, supra note 40, at 336.
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worthiness is seen as a judicial check on the overreaching private facts
tort necessary to protect the First Amendment, in reality the situation is
quite different. Courts have been historically reluctant to limit the
practical scope of the newsworthy doctrine for fear of censoring free
speech and violating the First Amendment.'26 The result of this judicial
reluctance to limit the scope of the newsworthiness defense has allowed
most defendants in private fact claims to prevail easily on summary judg-
ment. 27 Even the Virgil test, with its theoretical emphasis on jury
consideration and fhe application of community mores via the decency
limitation, has led to a rather small number of successful private fact
claims.'28 This apparent ineffectiveness has led scholars to advocate
putting the private facts tort to rest, 29 as North Carolina did in Hall v.
Post,3° or to simply adopt a broader test like the "leave it to the press"
approach.13 '
IV. THE VGIL TEST BALANCES INDiviDUAL
PRIVACY RIGHTS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The Virgil'32 test protects the First Amendment by adopting a
community mores approach in defining newsworthiness. The community
126 Woito & McNulty, supra note 16, at 222; see, e.g., Haynes v. Knopf,
Inc., 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993); Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870
F.2d 271 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989); Gilbert v. Medical
Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981); Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614
F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980); Ramos v. Front Page Detective Magazine, No. CIV.
A. No. 85-6932 1986 WL 11058 (E.D. Penn. Oct. 3, 1986); Pasadena Star-News
v. Superior Ct., 203 Cal. App. 3d 131 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); McNutt v. New
Mexico State Tribune Co., 538 P.2d 804 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 540 P.2d
248 (N.M. 1975); Freihoffer v. Hearst Corp., 480 N.E.2d 349 (N.Y. 1985);
Anderson v. Fisher Broad. Co., Inc., 712 P.2d 803 (Or. 1986); Anonsen v.
Donahue, 857 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2135
(1994).
127 Woito & McNulty, supra note 16, at 197.
128 Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 359. It is the author's belief that such
results are, in all probability, due to an unstated judicial fear of abridging the
First Amendment.
129 Id. at 365.
130 Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 717 (N.C. 1988).
131 Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 353.
12 Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
998 (1976).
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mores standard is broad enough that it does not define "news" ngid-
ly 133 However, the decency limitation, also dependent on community
mores, is not so vague that it will cause a "chilling effect" on the
media."' Additionally, the close judicial scrutiny mandated by the
Virgil court defeats the rationale for the Hall'35 and "leave it to the
press" approaches because it assures that the jury will not ride roughshod
over constitutional free speech guarantees. 136 The Virgil court's ruling
amounts to independent judicial factual review, and functions as a
constitutional safeguard.137
While the Virgil test assures adequate consideration of free speech
concerns, it does not sacrifice the individual's interest m maintaining his
own privacy Private fact suits are not discouraged because, unlike the
California 3 and the "nexus' 139 approaches, the claimant does not
have the difficult burden of proving reckless disregard on the part of the
press. Furthermore, the Virgil approach does not leave the tort without
limits. The jury's community mores decency test functions to remin m the
expansive newsworthiness defense. 4 ' Without the community mores
test the individual has only a theoretical recourse when embarrassing
private facts about him are disclosed in the media. Finally, a community
mores standard is sufficiently flexible to accommodate changing notions
about privacy 141
Assuming that the Supreme Court finds the tort constitutionally
valid, 42 it would then have to adopt a standard under which the press
133 For a complete discussion of this approach, see supra notes 96-108 and
accompanying text.
134 Woito & McNulty, supra note 16, at 227 ("When measured by common
understandings and practices, and when combined with the skill of the media in
ascertaining 'news,' morbid and sensational prying for its own sake clearly
conveys a sufficiently definite warning to avoid a chilling effect on the
dissemination of protected speech.").
13- Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988).
136 Virgil, 527 F.2d at 1129.
137 Woito & McNulty, supra note 16, at 230.
138 For discussion of California's test, see supra notes 118-24 and accompa-
nying text.
139 For discussion, see supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
140 Woito & McNulty, supra note 16, at 228.
141 Wick, supra note 99, at 425.
142 The Supreme Court has never considered the general constitutional
validity of the public disclosure of private facts tort, avoiding this issue with
narrow holdings in Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) and Florida
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would have the privilege of a newsworthy defense. The similarity of the
Virgil test and the Court's test for obscenity developed in Miller v.
California,14 indicates that the Supreme Court will adopt the Virgil and
Restatement approach.
Since the First Amendment is implicated any time speech is
restricted, an analogy may be drawn between the public disclosure tort
and obscenity issues. In Miller, the Court applied a reasonable per-
son/community mores test to determine obscenity.1" The similarity
between the Miller test for obscenity and the Virgil test for newsworthi-
ness is seen in the Miller provisions:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the
average person, applying contemporary community standards," would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.'45
Miller afffimed the proposition, established in Roth v. United
States,14 that obscenity is not a constitutionally protected form of free
speech.'47 Additionally, Miller attempted to resolve the problem of
differing geographic perceptions of what is obscene. 4 The Miller
Court was firmly committed to a reliance on the jury system, applying
contemporary community mores,'4 9 despite the possible abridgments of
First Amendment protections. 5' The Miller Court noted that the
possibility of inconsistent jury verdicts regarding similar material "does
not mean that constitutional rights are abridged.'' In acknowledging
that notions of obscenity will vary regionally, the Miller Court recognized
Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). The Court may not find the tort constitu-
tional if First Amendment free speech concerns are found to be paramount, as
previously discussed. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 305.
143 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
'44 Id. at 24.
141 Id. (citations omitted).
146 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
147 Miller, 413 U.S. at 20.
148 Id. at 25.
149 Id. at 26.
150 Id.
'' Id. at 26 n.9.
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that uniform national obscenity standards would be patently inadequate
to accommodate the fundamental differences in how sexual material is
perceived in Kentucky versus Times Square.152 The Virgil and Restate-
ment test for newsworthiness rests on similar reasoning. Indeed, the Virgil
court expressly cites Miller as its rationale for a community mores test:
"The fact that the standard [newsworthiness in Virgil] is made to depend
on community mores does not, to us, make it constitutionally infirm.
Community standards play a role of constitutional dimension in other
areas of free speech - e.g., as to the obscene nature of a publica-
tion." 1
53
Since the Miller Court firmly believed that local community mores,
applied by a jury, provide sufficient First Amendment protection for
persons accused of obscenity violations, it is natural to assume that the
Court will decide that the Virgil community mores newsworthiness
standard is constitutionally adequate. Furthermore, the Miller obscenity
test and the Virgil newsworthiness standard both incorporate a decency
limitation on privileged speech.'54 This is seen in Miller's "patently
offensive sexual conduct" provision, and in Virgil's "morbid and
sensational prying for its own sake."' 55 The similarity, discussed above,
behind the reasoning of the Miller obscenity test and the Virgil approach
to deciding newsworthiness provides a strong argument that the Court
will adopt the Virgil standard if and when it decides to broadly consider
the private facts tort.
5 6
CONCLUSION
The approach to newsworthiness taken by the Virgil'57 court and
the Restatement' is still the best balance between individual privacy
rights and First Amendment free speech guarantees. Therefore, it should
be the standard adopted by the Supreme Court if the Court finds that the
private facts tort passes constitutional muster. The community mores
standard and the decency limitation allow the citizenry to act as the
152 TEETER & LE Duc, supra note 32, at 349.
'-" Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 n.12 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoting
Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 998 (1976).
,' Woito & McNulty, supra note 16, at 226.
... Id. (summarizing each court's test).
156 Kalven, supra note 40, at 336 n.57.
157 Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
998 (1976).
158 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
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media's ultimate editor, while the court's concurrent factual scrutiny
prevents the community's censorship npulses from running wild over the
press's First Amendment protections. This combination achieves a fair
balance between the divergent interests inherent in any public disclosure
of private fact action.
Furthermore, as considered above, the similarity between the Virgil
and Restatement community mores or decency standard for newsworthi-
ness and the Supreme Court's test for obscenity as articulated in Miller
v. California indicates that the Virgil approach will survive First
Amendment scrutiny The Miller test for obscenity has survived twenty
years of constitutional consideration, and has become a fixture m the
Supreme Court's First Amendment framework. It follows that the
constitutional similarity between the Virgil newsworthiness standard and
the Miller obscenity test leaves a high probability that this standard for
newsworthiness will be the approach taken by our high court if and when
it chooses to broadly consider the constitutionality of the public disclo-
sure of private facts tort and its attendant newsworthy defense.
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